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EVANS V. NEWTON-AN UNCERTAIN LINE
INTRODUCTION

With the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and pending Congressional action on additional Civil Rights legislation, one of
the last remaining bulwarks of segregation will come under increased
scrutiny. This is the area of charitable trusts created by segregationminded testators who bequeath real property for the sole use of members
of the white race. Evans v. Newton,' decided on January 17, 1966,
provides the latest guidelines of the United States Supreme Court on
this subject. Two fundamental principles were considered in this case:
(1) The right of the individual to dispose of his property as he sees
fit, and (2) the constitutional ban in the Equal Protection clause' of the
Fourteenth Amendment against state-sponsored racial inequality.
A review of the factual situation in Evans v. Newton is necessary for
an understanding of the state of the law as it is today. In the Evans
case, the 1911 will of United States Senator Augustus Octavius Bacon
of Georgia, granted title4 to certain real property, known as "Baconsfield" to the City of Macon, Georgia, for the exclusive use of white
persons.3 Administration of this 100-acre tract, to be used as a park,
was vested in a Board of Managers," with the city as trustee. In order
to provide for the maintenance of the park, income from described real
property and bonds was to be expended by the Board of Managers.
The city kept the park segregated for many years, but around 1963
started letting Negroes use it, taking the position that the park was a
public facility which it could not constitutionally manage and maintain
on a segregated basis. On May 4, 1963, individual members of the
Board of Managers, including Charles E. Newton, brought this suit in
the Superior Court of Bibb County, Georgia, against the City of Macon
in its capacity as trustee of "Baconsfield." The Board of Managers
1. 86 S.Ct. 486 (1966).

2. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Supra note 1.
4. Item IX of the will of 0. A. Bacon, dated March 28, 1911.

"...

all right, title and

interest in and to said property hereinbefore described and bounded, both legal and
equitable ...shall vest in and belong to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon,
and to their successors forever, in trust ....
"
5. Id. Actually white men and white non-residents of Macon were excluded because the will specified "... white women, white girls, white boys and white children
of Macon."
6. Supra note 4.
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asked that the city be removed as trustee and this court appoint new
trustees to whom title to the park would be transferred. The obvious
purpose of this plan was to have the new trustees reinstate the policy
of segregation at the park, in accordance with Senator Bacon's will.
On May 20, the City of Macon filed its answer asserting that it
could not legally enforce racial segregation, and was therefore unable
to comply with the specific intention of Senator Bacon with regard
to the racial exclusion provision. The city asked that the court enter
a decree setting forth the duties and obligations of the city in the
premises. On June 18, Reverend E. S. Evans and others, Negro residents of Macon, filed an intervention in the cause and asserted that
the racial restriction violated the public policy 7 of the United States
and the laws of the State of Georgia. They further asserted that the
court as an agency of the State of Georgia could not, consistently with
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S.
Constitution and the equivalent provisions of the Constitution of the
State of Georgia, enter an order appointing private citizens as trustees
for the manifest purpose of operating public policy in a racially discriminatory manner." The intervenors asked the court to refuse to
appoint private persons as trustees. The City of Macon, now hopelessly
in the middle, filed an amendment to its answer, praying that the court
accept its resignation as trustee. On March 5, 1964, the Negro intervenors filed an amendment in which they asserted the Equal Protection
clause prohibits the court from accepting the resignation of the City
of Macon as trustee.
On May 10, the Superior Court of Bibb County, finding it unnecessary to discuss all the other significant issues raised in the year-long
litigation, solved its problem by accepting the resignation of the city
as trustee and appointing three private individuals as new trustees. On
appeal by the Negro intervenors, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed,9 holding that Senator Bacon had the right to give and bequeath
his property to a limited class, and that the Superior Court accept the
7. Intervenors' Petition, filed June 18, 1963, in the Superior Court of Bibb County,
defined public policy as "The public policy of the United States and of the State of
Georgia being that no citizen is to be deprived of the use, benefit and enjoyment of
any publicly owned or supported facility solely because of his race, national origin,
creed, or religion."
8. See, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) and Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts,
353 U.S. 230 (1957).
9. Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
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resignation of the city when the city was unable to comply with the
terms of the testamentary trust.
The Negro intervenors and the United States as amicus curiae petitioned the United States Supreme Court arguing that even after the
resignation of the City as trustee and the appointment of private trustees, there is still sufficient state involvement to bring the discriminatory
action of the new trustees within the bar of the Fourteenth Amendment. The members of the Board of Managers responded that the trust
was now independent of governmental control, even though it performed functions also performed by the State.
On April 26, 1965, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The problem had now resolved itself into two closely related
issues. First, could a charitable trust contain a racially discriminatory
provision if no governmental control of the trust was involved and,
second, where is the dividing line between "private" and "state" action,
the latter being required before the Fourteenth Amendment would
apply? Affirmance of the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia
would draw a line, permitting state judicial enforcement of at least
some charitable trusts that include racially discriminatory provisions.
Reversal would leave the final line still undrawn, but would serve
notice at least that where recreational facilities are made available by
charitable trust, they cannot be opened to all members of the public
except Negroes. 10
On January 17, 1966, the U. S. Supreme Court reversed" the decision, holding that the State through its courts had aided private
parties to perform the public function of maintaining a park on a segregated basis and therefore had implicated the State in the type of
conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The discussion in this article centers on the two main issues, charitable
trusts with racially discriminatory provisions and state action.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS WITH RAcIALLY DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS

At the time the will of Senator Bacon was probated and "Baconsfield" passed to the City of Macon, the law of the land and of the State
10. Professor Robert B. McKay, Evans v. Newton, Association of American Law
Schools, Committee on Supreme Court Decisions, November 29, 1965.
11. Evans v. Newton, 86 S.Ct. 486 (1966).
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of Georgia as expressed in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,12 permitted
a racially restrictive condition in a public charitable trust to be enforced
by the courts of the state wherein the trust was located. Georgia law
specifically provided, and still does,13 for the language used in the Bacon
will. It is interesting to note that two years before Evans, the Georgia
Supreme Court had sustained a testamentary trust establishing and
maintaining "a home for indigent colored people 60 years of age or
older residing in Augusta, Georgia." 14
Although the Code provision 15 did not require the testator to provide
a reason for including racial restrictions, Senator Bacon apparently felt
some explanation was desirable because he went to great lengths to point
out in his will that he had nothing against Negroes, even felt sincere
affection for some, but was definitely certain that the white and Negro
races should never enjoy recreational facilities together.' 6 It is not
surprising in view of this typical attitude, combined with conformity
to the Georgia Code, 17 and prior decisions of the court,' 8 that the
Georgia court held' 9 that Senator Bacon had an absolute right to give
and bequeath property to the city in trust for white persons only.
The United States Supreme Court was not as direct on the point as
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This decision sustained an 1890 Louisiana statute providing
for equal but separate accommodations for white and Negro railway passengers. The
majority opinion contained the following: "The object of the Fourteenth Amendment
was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in
the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based on
color ... or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either:'
13. GA. CODE ANN. § 69-504 (1957). This provision was adopted in 1905, six years
before Senator Bacon's will was executed.
14. Strother v. Kennedy, 218 Ga. 180, 127 S.E.2d 19 (1962).
15. Supra note 13.
16. Item IX of the will of A. 0. Bacon, dated March 28, 1911. "I take occasion to
say that in limiting the use and enjoyment of this property perpetually to white
people, I am not influenced by any unkindness of feeling or want of consideration for
the Negroes, or colored people. On the contrary I have for them the kindest feeling,
and for many of them esteem and regard, while for some of them I have sincere
personal affection. I am, however, without hesitation in the opinion that in their
social relations the two races should be forever separate and that they should not have
pleasure or recreation grounds to be used or enjoyed, together and in common. I am
moved to make this bequest of said property for the use, benefit and enjoyment of the
white people of the City of Macon from whom through a long lifetime I have received
so much of personal kindness and so much public honor; and especially as a memorial
to my ever lamented and only sons . .
17. Supra note 13.
18. Strother v. Kennedy, supra note 14, and Houston v. Mills Memorial Home, 202
Ga. 540, 43 S.E.2d 680 (1947) (Permitting trust for home for Negro aged)
19. Evans v. Newton, supra note 9.
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the Georgia court had been. Although the Supreme Court reversed the
decision,2" it did so on state action grounds, touching only briefly on
the racially restrictive language of the trust itself, implying that in
the absence of state action racial restrictions would be constitutional.
"If a testator wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one
race only and in no way implicated the State in the supervision,
control or management of that facility, we assume arguendo that no
constitutional difficulty would be encountered." 21 Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting on other grounds, stated: "So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the curtailing of private discriminatory acts, to the
extent they may be forbidden at all, is a matter that is left to the States
acting within the permissible range of their police power." . The Supreme Court had concluded in Shelley v. Kraemer2 3 that
restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to petitioner by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated
by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that
there has been no action by the State and the provisions of the
24
Amendment have not been violated.
...

It appears from Shelley v. Kraemer and Evans, that racially restrictive provisions, absent state action, are constitutional. Any lingering
doubts are based on the implications arising out of the use of such terms
as it would appear 5 and we assume arguendo2 6-perhaps the Supreme
Court has been leaving itself an emergency exit against the possibility
it might have to decide in the future that such provisions are unconstitutional.
STATE ACTION

The crux of all racial segregation cases seeking to invoke the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the extent of state
20. Evans v. Newton, supra note 1.
21. Id. at 489.
22. Id. at 497.
23. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley v. Kraemer is, of course, more often cited as authority
for the proposition that it is unconstitutional for a state court to enforce racial restrictions in private real estate agreements. The case also stands for the proposition, however, that the equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private conduct.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Ibid.
26. Evans v. Newton, supra note 21.
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involvement. In fact, the inhibition against denial of the equal protection of the laws has exclusive reference to State action.2 7 The definition of "state" includes its legislative, executive, and judicial branches-"
therefore the equal protection clause not only prohibits discriminating
legislation, but also has reference to the way the law is' administered
and interpreted.
Most of the current and anticipated litigation on segregation has to
9 contains a statedo with judicial enforcement. Shelley v. Kraemer"
ment by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson emphasizing the importance of
judicial power in discrimination cases:
These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States have
merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such discrimination as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in
which the states have made available to such individuals the full
coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds
of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which
petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the
grantors are willing to sell. The difference between judicial enforcement and nonenforcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference
to petitioners between being denied rights of property available to
other members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment
30
on an equal footing.
Nine years after Shelley, the Supreme Court considered the Girard
College Case, Pennsylvania v. Board of Trust. 3 ' The will of Stephen
Girard, probated in 1831, set up Girard College for "poor white male
orphans," with the City of Philadelphia as trustee. The case arose
when Negro petitioners were denied admission to the school. The
27. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. "No state shall make or enforce any law ... nor
deny to any person.. . the equal protection of the laws." The trend is towards finding
"state" action in many heretofore "private" areas. See, e.g., Robinson v. Florida, 378
U.S. 153 (1964) (State health regulation requiring separate toilet facilities for white and
Negro is "State" action); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) ("State" action
includes the order of a private park guard acting under color of his authority as a
deputy sheriff); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ("State" action includes suppression of freedom of speech in a company-owned town); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944) ("State" action found where Negroes denied right to vote in primary
election, even though political party that determined voter qualifications was a voluntary association).
28. Virginia v. Rives, 100 US. 313, 318 (1880).
29. Supra note 23.
30. Id. at 19.
31. 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
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United States Supreme Court, in reversing 32 a state court refusal to
order admission, pointed out the Board of Directors was an agency of
the State of Pennsylvania by legislative act, and that the refusal to admit
Negroes to the College was therefore discrimination by the State. The
state courts then removed the Board of Directors and substituted therefore thirteen private citizens, none of whom held any public office or
otherwise exercised any governmental power under the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari."
Recalling the statement of Chief Justice Vinson in Shelley, 34 wouldn't
the decisions, per se, of the state courts in the Girard College Case
constitute "state" action? In denying certiorari the effect was to allow
the state courts to deny rights available to other members of the community, the same rationale as in Shelley. Eight years after the Girard
College Case, the Supreme Court in Evans held that state courts that
aid private parties to perform a public function on a segregated basis
implicate the state in conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment ' 5 The Evans rule seems to support the earlier Shelley rule, more
than the rule (or lack of it) developed in the Girard College Case. It
is significant that in Evans the court devoted relatively little consideration to the actions of the state courts, preferring to base their holding primarily on the grounds of the tradition of municipal control of
"Baconsfield." 11 In summarizing the trend from Shelley to Evans, it
appears that the decision of a state court, per se, is not sufficient "state"
action to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment. Some additional form
of "state" action must be found.
Another form of "state" action was found in Evans. The court in
effect extended the definition of "state" action to include "private"
action, if the services performed by the private individuals are of a
municipal nature and had formerly been performed by the municipality. This new concept makes the Evans case significant. The Negro
petitioners and the United States as amicus curiae successfully argued
that even after the resignation of the city as trustee and designation
32. Ibid.
33. In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied 357
U.S. 570 (1958).
34. Supra note 23 at 19.
35. Evans v. Newton, supra note 20 at 490.
36. Id. at 489.
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by the court of private trustees there was in the totality of the circumstances sufficient state involvement to bring discriminatory action of
the trustees within the bar of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held3 7 that the momentum "Baconsfield" acquired as a
public facility was not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of
"private" trustees. In supporting this conclusion the Court emphasized
the tradition of municipal control, the nature of the service rendered
by a park and the public interest inherent in mass recreation.38
CONCLUSION

The Evans case lends authority to the proposition that it is still constitutional to include racially discriminatory provisions in private agreements, wills and trusts. They are of little permanent value, of course,
unless they can be enforced in the courts. Apparently, and this line
is uncertain, mere action by the state courts will not be sufficient "state"
action to raise a Fourteenth Amendment question. However, as in
Evans, state court action may be cited as supporting the overall conclusion that "state" action has occurred.
To the previous definition of "state" action, Evans adds the proposition that a municipality cannot preserve segregation in a municipal park
by subsequently transferring tide to private individuals-the public nature of the park remains. Although this appears to be a definite dividing
line, the court made it uncertain by implying that there might be a
different result if the public characteristics dissipated in time. "If the

municipality remains entwined in the management or control of the
park, it remains subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amend37. Id. at 486.
38. Id. at 489. "... where the tradition of municipal control had become firmly
established we cannot take judicial notice that the mere substitution of trustees instantly
transferred this park from the public to the private sector . . . This conclusion is
buttressed by the nature of the service rendered the community by the park. The service
rendered even by a private park of this character is municipal in nature. It is open
to every white person, there being no selective element other than race . . . A park
is more like a fire department or police department that traditionally serves the community. Mass recreation through the use of parks is plainly in the public domain . ..
[tihe predominant character and purpose of this park is municipal... Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot but conclude that the public character of this park
requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who now has tide under state law. We may fairly
assume that had the Georgia courts been of the view that even in private hands the
park may not be operated for the public on a segregated basis, the resignation would
not have been approved and private trustees appointed."
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ment." 39 In the final analysis then, Evans provides a new definition
of "state" action, but leaves it possible to subsequently erase the dividing line between "state" and "private" action on the basis of changes
in the factual situation-if the public characteristics dissipate in time,
then there remains only private action, insufficient to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a dividing line can only be characterized as
-an uncertain line.
FredericH. Bertrand

39. Ibid.

